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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
MICHAEL J. HILLYARD,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.

Case No. 15964

CITY COURT OF LOGAN CITY,
COUNTY OF CACHE, STATE OF
UTAH,
Defendant and Appellant.

N1ICUS CURIAE BRIEF OF STATEWIDE ASSOCIATION OF
PROSECUTORS OF UTAH ON REHEARING IN SUPPORT
OF DEFENDANT/APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR REHEARING

* * * *
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a civil action brought by the Plaintiff
seeking a Writ of Prohibition.

The District Court in Cache

County, State of Utah, granted the Writ of Prohibition and
the Supreme Court of the State of Utah on the 18th day of
April, 1978 upheld the Judgment of the District Court.
The amicus curiae brief herein respectfully submitted seeks the relief of reversal of the Court's prior
decision.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
As to the purpose of this brief, the statement
of facts contained in the briefs of the Appellant are
relied upon.
For the information of the Court, the Statewide
Association of Prosecutors filing this amicus curiae brief
is a non-profit corporation organized under the laws of the
State of Utah comprised of all prosecutors throughout the
State.
The Prosecutors' Advisory Board comprised of five
county attorneys, the Attorney General, and a representative
from the city attorneys' offices have unanimously concurred
in the filing of this brief.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE DECISION OF HILLYARD FAILS TO GIVE EFFECT TO
THE EXPRESS MEANING OF THE APPLICABLE STATUTES.
A.

The Legislature has consistently attempted

to provide the option that misdemeanors may be filed in the
City Court.

An historical review of the Sections related

to the subject follows.
Section 77-13-17, U.C.A., as amended, states:
"When an arrest is made without a warrant
by a peace officer or private person, the
person arrested must, without unnecessary
delay, be taken to the magistrate in the
precinct of the county or city in which the
offense occurred, and a complaint stating
the charge against the person must be made
before such magistrate.
In the event the
-2-
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magistrate of the precinct is not available, the arrested person shall be taken
before the nearest available magistrate
to the scene of the alleged offense. A
conductor or other person who makes an
arrest as provided in Section 77-13-5
shall without unnecessary delay take the
person so arrested before any accessible
magistrate or deliver him to a peace officer;
and a complaint stating the charge against
the person must be made. The magistrate
before whom such a charge is made, if the
offense is tryable by him, shall have full
jurisdiction over the offense and the defendant to try and determine such offense.
If
he has not jurisdiction to try the defendant
for the offense charged, he must proceed
as provided in Chapter 15 of this Title.
Any officer or person violating any of the
provisions of this Section shall be guilty
of a misdemeanor."
It's evident this statute requires the defendant to
be taken to the precinct in the county or city where the
offense occurred.

It also provides that where the magis-

trate in the precinct is not available, the defendant can be
taken to the nearest available magistrate.

The purpose of

this statute is to prevent judge shopping by peace officers.
It is obvious that officers may "shop" for the "most available" Justice of the Peace when such Justices maintain
irregular hours.
The Legislature, realizing that problems could
arise for the prosecution and for defendants facing non
law-trained Justices when such defendants were taken only
before the local magistrate, provided in Section 78-4-16.5,
U.C.A., as enacted in 1971, the option to have the
criminal proceeding commence before a city court.

The
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Statute reads as follows:
"Whenever a complaint may be commenced before
a magistrate under Section 77-57-2, or an
arrested person is to be taken before a magistrate under Section 77-13-17, the complaint
may be commenced or the arrested person may
be taken before the nearest city court judge
in counties where city courts have been
established."
The option of going before the city court was
effectively curtailed in the case of Wells vs. City Court
of Logan City, 535 P.2d 683

(Utah 1975), where the Court said

that the provisions of Section 41-6-166, U.C.A., as amended
in 1953, required that a defendant be taken to the nearest
magistrate and that that magistrate had exclusive jurisdiction.

Section 41-6-166 prior to 1975 did not identify

the purpose for which the person was taken before the magistrate implying that the magistrate was granted full jurisdiction over the case and was the party before whom the case
should be tried.

Following the Wells decision, the Utah

Legislature amended Section 41-6-166 clearly making known
their intention to only require

the appearance to be

" ... for the purpose of setting bond".
The effect of this change restored the option of
Section 78-4-16.5, U.C.A., allowing proceedings to be begun
either in the magistrate's court or in the city court as
determined by the arresting officer or the prosecutor.
unfortunately, in the recent Hillyard decision,
the Court failed to follow the expressed meaning of Section
41-6-166, U.C.A., as amended, and instead chose to follow
-4-
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the Wells decision under the former Section 41-6-166, u.C.A.,
statute.
B.

The majority of the Court held in Hillyard

that Section 41-6-166, U.C.A., was the controlling statute
because it was later and more specific as compared to Section
78-4-16.5, U.C.A.,

(1971), and Section 77-13-17, U.C.A.,

(1971), which are more general statutes.

However, the reason

Section 41-6-166, U.C.A., is later is only because it was
amended in 1975 to add in the words " ••. for the purpose of
setting bond".
The amendment was clearly an intention by the
Legislature to clarify its belief that matters needed only
be taken before the magistrate for the purpose of setting
bond, but there was an option later for trial before the
city courts.
The Hillyard decision throws out the option of
Section 78-4-16.5, U.C.A. allowing the matter to be taken
before the city courts which was the express intent of the
Legislature when it amended Section 41-6-166, U.C.A., for
the purpose of allowing that option following the Wells
decision.

c.

Section 41-6-166, U.C.A., is located in the

traffic rules and regulations provisions of the Code and
provides for an appearance before a magistrate for the
purpose of taking bond (emphasis added) •

This is to in-

sure procedural due process is provided the individual and
he is taken immediately, if he desires, before an appropriate
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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magistrate.
The requirement in the statute to appear does not

1

include the requirement to file a formal complaint or the
commencement of the proceedings or the anticipation of conferring exclusive jurisdiction on the magistrate to try the
case.
Exclusive jurisdiction begins at the time the
complaint is filed before the appropriate court.
The clear Legislative intent throughout these
series of statutes has been to provide the opportunity for
defendants to be tried before a law-trained judge with the
highest level of skill and experience.

To attach exclusive

jurisdiction to the magistrate upon the initial appearance
of the defendant simply frustrates this Legislative intent.
POINT II.
THE HILLYARD DECISION FRUSTRATES THE PURPOSE OF THE
CIRCUIT COURT ACT.
The problems spoken of above are further compounded
when the new Circuit Court Act having taken effect July 1,
1978 is considered.

The Circuit Court Act gives jurisdictioo

to each circuit over all misdemeanors except that complaints
dealing with Title 41 (Traffic Violations) excluding drunk
driving and reckless driving charges are retained to be
filed before the municipal justice of the peace where the
offense occurred.

The Act also allows the option to commence

a complaint before any Circuit Court Judge in the county in
which the offense occurred.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
-6- by the Utah State Library.
Library Services and Technology Act, administered
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

i

The provision Section 78-4-5, U.C.A., as amended,
dealing with the Circuit Courts incorporates the language
of Section 78-4-16.5, U.C.A., with the exception of changing
the language to allow the matter to be brought before the
Circuit Court rather than the City Judge.

The critical

language is in paragraph one thereof which states,
"Whenever a complaint may be commenced before
a magistrate under Section 77-57-2 where an
arrested person is to be taken before a magistrate under Section 77-13-17, the complaint
may be commenced or the arrested person may
be taken before any circuit court judge in
the county or the just~ce of the peace in
the county in whose precinct the events
occurred .•. " (emphasis added)
This, of course, is obviously similar to the
language used under the prior Section 78-4-16.5, U.C.A.,
which was the law prior to July 1, 1978.
The Hillyard case will affect the application of
the new Circuit Court Act just as it would affect the city
courts by defeating the possibility of bringing the defendant before the circuit court if the offense occurred in
a precinct where a justice presided.
The problem can be resolved if the court in
reconsidering the Hillyard decision will consider the
language in Section 41-6-166, U.C.A., providing that the
defendant appear before the nearest magistrate "for the
purpose of setting bond" only and then allow the trial to
commenced before the circuit court.

-7-
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Section 78-4-2, U.C.A., 1953, as amended in 1977,
dealing with the circuit courts states that the act should be
liberally construed to accomplish the purpose of providing
full-time professional judicial service to every county.
The Court's reversal of the Hillyard decision would
accomplish this obviously recent Legislative desire.
POINT III.
THE INTEREST OF PROSECUTORS OF UTAH AND ALL CONCERNED PARTIES WOULD BE BETTER SERVED BY INTERPRETING THE
CURRENT LEGISLATION ALLOv7ING THESE MATTERS TO BE TRIED BEFORE
THE CIRCUIT COURT.
Under Section 78-5-4, U .C.A. 1953, as amended 1957,
any person charged with an offense that carries a possible
jail sentence has a right to request that the proceeding
be handled by a judge who is a member of the Utah State Bar.
Witness the language:
"Notwithstanding any provision of this Code
relating to jurisdiction or venue of justice
courts, in any matter in which the judge has
the option of imposing a jail sentence, the
defendant may demand and shall be accorded
the right to have his case tried before a
judge who is a member of the Utah State Bar".
Combining this statute with the Hillyard decision illustrates
the problem.

For example, the prosecutor will be forced to

file the case before the magistrate where the initial appea~
ance was had for the purpose of setting bond.

Then the

defendant can made a demand for a law-trained judge thus increasing the time and expenses of the proceedings.

The

prosecutor runs the additional risk that he may have multiple
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trialsthroughout the county in various locals and often
distant precincts.
On the other hand, under the interpretation of the
statutes as advanced by this brief, the prosecutor would
initially file before the law-trained judge the action.
This would increase the effectiveness of the system and its
efficiency.

After June 1978 if the Hillyard decision were

reversed, drunk driving cases would be filed in the Circuit
Courts providing the use of full-time, law-trained judges
and increasing the professional level of the Utah Judicial
System.

This advantage is lost if prosecutions are not

allowed to be initiated in the Circuit Court after the defendant is taken before the magistrate court for the purpose
of setting bond.
It becomes obvious immediately the difficulties
prosecutors face when these matters may be filed before
multiple courts where justices of the peace preside.

The

problem is more complex for the rural counties than for
the urban counties; and traditionally, rural prosecutors
are paid less than urban prosecutors and face the tremendous
strain of a greatly-increased workload.
Also, strictly reading the language of the Hillyard
decision, if jurisdiction exclusively attaches in the magistrate court, how can the defendant qualify for a law-trained
judge?

The matter cannot be transferred if the exclusive

jurisdiction exists.

-9-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

CONCLUSIOn
In conclusion, the Statewide Association of
Prosecutors respectfully submits that the proper application
of the broad legal principles applied herein would require
the reversal of the Hillyard decision and allow the influence of the Circuit Court Act to consider these difficult
motor vehicle violations for trial.
RESPECTFULLY

31st day of July, 1978,

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a conforming copy of
the foregoing Brief, postage prepaid, to the following:
Mr. George W. Preston
Deputy Cache County Attorney
Attorney for Defendant and Appellant
31 Federal Avenue
Logan, Utah 84321
Gordon J. Low, Esquire
HILLYARD, GUNNELL & LOW
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Respondent
175 East First North
Logan, Utah 84321
this 1st day of August, 197

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

